In 3], the authors present cryptographic transformations based on Cellular Automata. These transformations are used to de ne block ciphers and stream ciphers. It is claimed that the cryptographic transformations generate the alternating group and that the cryptosystems are secure. Both of these claims are incorrect.
The systems in 3] are based on permutations of the vector space V N of dimension N over GF (2) . These permutations are obtained from Cellular Automata. The speci c permutations used (called fundamental transformations in 3]) are in fact a ne. Thus the group generated by these permutations is a subgroup of the A ne group on V N and not the Alternating group A V N as claimed. The a ne group is a small subgroup of the alternating group. In any case, knowing that the group generated by the cryptographic transformations contains the alternating group gives no guarantee of security (see 2]).
The various ciphers proposed are cryptographically weak as they depend on a ne transformations. We examine each in turn.
The Block Cipher
We rst note that there appears to be no mechanism for changing the key as the authors propose that it is stored in ROM. The ability to change the key is essential for any cipher. Our cryptanalysis is independent of this observation. 
PCA with ROM Generator
The PCA with ROM generator consists of l invertible L L binary matrices R 0 ; : : :; R l?1 stored in ROM. Let V be an L dimensional binary vector space.
The state of the generator v(t) := (v 1 (t); : : :; v L (t)) at time t is an element of V . At time (t + 1), the new state of the generator is de ned by v(t + 1) = R t 0 v(t), where t 0 = t mod l. At time t, the generator outputs the four bits v h (t); v h+1 (t); v h+2 (t) and v h+3 (t) where h is time independent.
This generator is insecure as decimations of its output sequence have low linear complexity. For example, consider the sequence w = w(0); w(1); : : : 
The Two Stage PCA Generator
The second generator consists of two cellular automata PCA 1 and PCA 2 . PCA 2 has a xed next state function and is regularly clocked. Its output is used to control the next state function of PCA 1 .
We can de ne the automaton PCA 2 as follows. Its current state k(t) = (k 1 (t); k 2 (t); : : :; k L (t)) is a binary vector of length L. We cryptanalyse the generator as follows. We assume we have a segment of the keystream (a small multiple of L bits should su ce). Firstly, we guess h. There are at most four choices for h in the system proposed in 3] and we try each in turn.
We then note that v h+1 (t + 1) = v h (t) v h+2 (t) k h+1 (t)v h+1 (t): (1) If we know all the output terms appearing in this equation, we can deduce k h+1 (t) whenever v h+1 (t) 6 = 0. The correlation given by this equation is a serious weakness of this type of cipher, whatever the size of L. For the purposes of this cryptanalysis, we assume that v h+1 (t) is an approximately balanced sequence. If this is not the case, the output sequence is very weak, and is easily analysed. Using our knowledge of the keystream, we can calculate about half the bits in a segment of the sequence k h+1 (0); k h+1 (1); : : : :
This sequence has linear complexity at most L, since it is generated by PCA 2 which has a linear next state function and output function. We may therefore recover all the sequence k h+1 (0); k h+1 (1); : : : using standard techniques (see for example 1, pages 209-214]). Similarly, by examining the output sequences v h+1 (t), v h+2 (t) and v h+3 (t) we can recover the sequence k h+2 (0); k h+2 (1); : : :.
We have obtained two of the output sequences for the generator PCA 2 .
We We can generate more equations by using more cipher output bits. The probability of inconsistency then converges to one geometrically fast.
In summary, by checking each possibility for x 1 ; : : :; x L for consistency with the known outputs of PCA 2 and then with the known outputs of PCA 1 , we can nd | with very high probability | the next state function of PCA 2 . In accomplishing this, we have derived k(0) and can easily calculate v(0). We 
